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Cournot Oligopoly and Concavo-Concave Demand
Abstract. The  -firm Cournot model with general technologies is reviewed
to derive generalized and unified conditions for existence of a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium. Tight conditions are formulated alternatively (i) in terms
of concavity of two-sided transforms of inverse demand, or (ii) as linear con-
straints on the elasticities of inverse demand and its first derivative. These
conditions hold, in particular, if a firm’s marginal revenue decreases in other
firms’ aggregate output, or if inverse demand is logconcave. The analysis re-
lies on lattice-theoretic methods, engaging both cardinal and ordinal notions
of supermodularity. As a byproduct, a powerful test for strict quasiconcavity
is obtained.
Keywords. Cournot competition; existence of Nash equilibrium; concavity
of demand; supermodular games; strict quasiconcavity.
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1. Introduction
Given that the prediction of the Cournot model is widely acknowledged as a
useful benchmark in the analysis of antitrust regulation, it is a striking fact
that the conditions under which a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists are
still not fully understood. Existence is known to depend on characteristics
of the market demand, on restrictions imposed by technology, and even on
the question of equal access to technology (cf., e.g., Vives, 1999). But it is
certainly desirable to fully clarify how existence depends on these primitives
of the environment. The present paper develops a new notion, referred to
as biconcavity of demand, and applies it to derive unified and generalized
conditions for equilibrium existence in an oligopolistic market for a single
commodity. The analysis investigates the usefulness of the new concept also
for a number of issues other than equilibrium existence.
In the literature, there are essentially two main types of theorems that
ascertain existence from conditions on the primitives of the model. A first ap-
proach, associated with contributions by McManus (1962, 1964) and Roberts
and Sonnenschein (1976), allows for general demand functions and convex
technologies. Existence can be shown under these conditions for a finite
number of identical firms.1 Amir and Laibson (2000) have rebuilt and gen-
eralized this theory for symmetric firms using the theory of supermodular
games and Tarski’s fixed point theorem. A second approach, developed by
Novshek (1985) and Bamon and Frayssé (1985), applies to any finite col-
lection of firms and arbitrary technologies, imposing instead restrictions on
1Kukushkin (1993) relaxes the assumption of identical technologies to incorporate firm-
specific capacity constraints.
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market demand. This approach has its origins in an observation by Selten
(1970).2 The state of the art is Amir’s (1996) comprehensive derivation of
results from the perspective of the theory of supermodular games.3
Despite this impressive progress, the inquiry into the existence question
is by no means settled. In particular, in the second approach that allows
for general technologies, two genuinely different conditions coexist in the
literature. The so-called cardinal test evaluates the sign of a certain cross-
partial derivative of the firm’s profit function. If this sign is nonpositive,
then Cournot profits are submodular in own output and rivals’ joint output,
so that an equilibrium can be shown to exist. The so-called ordinal test
merely requires that inverse demand is logconcave. In that case, profits are
logsubmodular, which likewise helps existence. In an important contribution,
Amir (2005) has pointed out that neither of these tests is more stringent than
the respective other. Moreover, other tests work only in special cases. Thus,
it appears that two conditions of equal standing individually ensure existence
for general technologies, which is puzzling.
In this paper, we introduce a new concept, biconcavity of demand, and
use it to formulate generalized conditions for existence of a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in Cournot games. Biconcavity is an intuitive notion. It
requires that the inverse demand function is concave following monotonous
transformations of the scales for both price and quantity. Examples of bicon-
2While Selten (1970) conceptualized the important “Einpassungsfunktion” and proved
existence using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, the general result obtained by Novshek
(1985) and Bamon and Frayssé (1985) requires an additional argument, which was distilled
into a fixed-point theorem by Kukushkin (1994).
3A third, complementary approach assumes profits to be quasiconcave. See below and
Section 6.
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cavity have been used in the literature, but the general notion is apparently
new.4 Biconcavity seems to be just the right concept to formulate conditions
on demand that imply monotonicity properties for the best response. In
the smooth case with downward-sloping inverse demand, we obtain as main
condition for existence that
1 + 0 + (||− 1) = 0 (1)
for some parameter  ∈ [0; 1], where  and 0 denote the elasticities of
inverse market demand and of its first derivative. We also prove a result to
the effect that this linear bound cannot be tightened further.
To derive the general existence theorem, which does not impose smooth-
ness, methods developed by Novshek (1985) and Amir (1996) are combined
and enhanced. First, we show that biconcavity of demand implies that suit-
ably transformed revenues have decreasing differences in the relevant domain.
Then, a new lattice-theoretic argument is used to prove that this property of
transformed revenues is sufficient for a dual single-crossing property of the
firm’s profits. Finally, invoking a generalized theorem of the maximum, con-
dition (1) is found to imply that best-response correspondences allow a nonin-
creasing selection. By the virtue of the Bamon-Frayssé/Novshek/Kukushkin
fixed point theorem, this ensures existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies. As a matter of fact, the resulting existence theorem contains
virtually all earlier results for general technologies as special cases, and even
makes an additional step ahead.
4Specifically, in the context of Bertrand competition, Caplin and Nalebuff (1991b)
consider a direct demand function that is logconcave in the log-transformed price. See
also Section 2.
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The theoretical development allows a number of extensions, some of which
may be unexpected. In particular, we construct an “atypical” oligopoly with
strategic substitutes that exhibits local complementarities once linear costs
are introduced. As will be argued, this possibility implies that an increase
in the corporate tax rate might affect interfirm competition in a potentially
important way. Further extensions deal with global strategic complements,
strict quasiconcavity, technological indivisibilities, and equilibrium unique-
ness. The result on quasiconcavity deserves special mentioning because this
finding, too, unifies various conditions that can be found in the literature.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our
assumption of biconcave demand, and explains why it implies decreasing
differences of suitably transformed Cournot revenues. The existence theorem
is stated and discussed in Section 3. We elaborate on the tightness of the
biconcavity condition in Section 4. Section 5 uses an example to illustrate
the mechanics behind the existence result. Further extensions can be found
in Section 6. Most of the proofs have been collected in the Appendix.
2. Biconcavity
In this section, we introduce the notion of biconcavity, which will be the main
technical tool in the subsequent analysis of the Cournot model. Biconcavity
is a property of real-valued functions that is more flexible than the standard
definition of concavity. In particular, new classes of demand functions can
be described in a convenient way. We first define biconcavity, and discuss its
elementary properties. Following the general definition, an important lemma
is presented that links biconcavity of demand to decreasing differences of
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suitably transformed revenues.
Definition 2.1. Let   ∈ R. For  6= 0,  6= 0, a function  defined on
the positive reals is called ( )-biconcave if for all   0 b  0 such that
()  0 (b)  0, the inequality
({ + (1− )b}1) = {() + (1− )(b)}1 (2)
is satisfied for all 0 5  5 1. For  = 0 or  = 0, the respective weighted
sum in (2) is replaced by the corresponding weighted harmonic mean.5
For  and  positive, the definition says that () is concave in  in the
(necessarily convex) domain where  is positive. This follows as a result of
the substitution  = . More generally, for   6= 0, the condition for
( )-biconcavity of  is that the domain where  is positive is convex, and
that () is concave in  in that domain.
If  is both ( )-biconcave and weakly decreasing, then  is also (0 0)-
biconcave for any 0 5  and 0 5 . Indeed, as in Caplin and Nalebuff
(1991a), the Hölder mean on the right-hand side of (2) and likewise the
argument on the left-hand side is weakly increasing in  and , respectively,
which proves the claim. It is essential here that  is nonincreasing. Without
this assumption, it is not generally true that higher values for  correspond
to more stringent variants of biconcavity.
Obviously, (1 1)-biconcavity corresponds to the standard definition of
concavity, while (0 1)-biconcavity is logconcavity of  . More generally,  = 1
corresponds to the univariate case of generalized concavity (Caplin and Nale-
5I.e., at  = 0, the right-hand side of (2) is set to ()(b)1−. At  = 0, the
argument in the left-hand side of (2) is set to b1−.
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buff, 1991a). To see that biconcavity is more flexible than generalized concav-
ity, one checks that (0 0)-biconcavity corresponds to () being logconcave
in ln(), but this condition, as noted by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991b), does
not correspond to a generalized concavity condition.
When  is smooth, a simple condition involving first and second deriva-
tives characterizes biconcavity.
Lemma 2.2. Consider a function  defined on the positive reals that is twice
differentiable when positive. For   ∈ R, the function  is ( )-biconcave
if and only if the support set  = {  0 : ()  0} is an interval, and the
inequality
∆() = (− 1) 0()2+ () 00()+ (1− )() 0() 5 0 (3)
holds for all  ∈  .
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
Of particular importance for equilibrium existence is the class of ( )-
biconcave inverse demand functions with  = 1 − . As the next result
will show, these demand functions have the useful property that suitably
transformed revenues exhibit decreasing differences, which will be a key step
in the proof of the existence result. For revenues, we will use the notation
∗(  ) = ( +  ). Write  : R++ → R for the mapping  7→  if
 6= 0, and 0 for the logarithm.
Lemma 2.3. Let  be a nonincreasing function that is ( 1− )-biconcave
for some  = 0. Then for any b   = 0 and for any b   = 0 such
that both ∗(b b )  0 and ∗(  )  0, transformed revenues  ◦∗ exhibit
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decreasing differences, i.e.,
(∗(  ))− (∗( b )) 5 (∗(b  ))− (∗(b b )) (4)
is satisfied.6
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
To get an intuition for this result, recall the fact that if inverse demand is
actually concave and declining over the relevant domain, then the drop in
price resulting from a given increase in rivals’ output will be more pronounced
as own output increases. Lemma 2.3 follows a similar logic. Under the
assumptions made, the loss in (transformed) revenues resulting from a given
increase in rivals’ output will be larger as own output increases. However,
to take account of the quantity dimension of revenues, concavity of demand
needs to be replaced by the biconcavity assumption.
3. Existence theorem
We consider an industry composed of  = 1 firms producing a homogeneous
good. Firm  produces the good in quantity  = 0. Its cost function is
(), defined for all  = 0. Denote inverse demand by () ∈ R+, where
 =P=1  is aggregate output. Firm ’s profit is




 is the joint output of firm ’s competitors. Denote by
(−) = { = 0 : Π( −) = Π(e −) for all e = 0} (6)
6Note that inequality (4) is well-defined because  is convex.
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the set of firm ’s best responses to an aggregate rival output − = 0.
A Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a vector of quantities (1  ) such that
 ∈ (−) for  = 1   .
The following lattice-theoretic result is the key to the subsequently stated
existence theorem. The result says that provided suitably transformed rev-
enues exhibit decreasing differences, and costs are nondecreasing, profits sat-
isfy the dual single-crossing property.
Lemma 3.1. Let  ∈ [0; 1]. Take some b   = 0, b−  − = 0,
such that (b + b−)  0. Assume that  is nonincreasing, and that  is
nondecreasing. Assume also that  ◦ exhibits decreasing differences, i.e.,
((b −))− (( −)) = ((b b−))− (( b−)). (7)
Then Π satisfies the dual single-crossing property, i.e.,
Π( −)−Π(b −) = 0⇒ Π( b−)−Π(b b−) = 0. (8)
If in addition,  is strictly decreasing when positive,   1, and  is strictly
increasing, then Π satisfies the strict single-crossing property, i.e., (8) with
a strict inequality in the concluding inequality.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
To understand why Lemma 3.1 holds, it is important to acknowledge that
there are two possible regimes. In the first, marginal revenues are zero or
negative when the output of other firms is low. Under this regime, the fact
that revenues are “submodularizable” directly implies that marginal revenues
remain zero or negative when the output of other firms increases. Clearly
then, a fortiori, marginal profits must be zero or negative when rivals’ joint
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output is high, as desired. In the second regime, marginal revenues are pos-
itive when rivals’ joint output is low. But then, since revenues are declining
in the other firms’ output, and since in addition, concavely transformed rev-
enues exhibit decreasing differences, marginal revenues must be smaller when
the output of other firms increases. Thus, under either regime, an expansion
of output cannot become attractive just because competing firms increase
their output.
Combining Lemmas 2.2 and 3.1, we arrive at the following existence the-
orem, which is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 3.2. Given a market for a single homogeneous good with inverse
demand , and  firms with cost functions 1   , if
1. there exists an output level  = 0 such that () 5 ()− (0) for
all    and for all  = 1   ,
2. the function  is nonincreasing, left-continuous with lim→0() = 0,
as well as ( 1− )-biconcave for some  ∈ [0; 1], and
3. for  = 1   , the cost function  : R+ → R+ is left-continuous and
nondecreasing,
then each firm ’s best-response correspondence  allows a nonincreasing
selection. Moreover, a Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
At the time of writing, Theorem 3.2 is the most general existence result for
Cournot games with general technologies. To start with, Amir’s (1996) The-
orem 3.1 corresponds to  = 0. Here, the transformation  is the logarithm,
while 1− is the identity mapping, so that inverse demand is assumed log-
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concave. It will be noted that weak monotonicity of inverse demand and
costs is sufficient for existence.7 Another special case is Novshek’s (1985)
Theorem 3. To see this, assume for the moment that  is twice continuously
differentiable when positive. For  = 1, the smooth condition for biconcavity
(Lemma 2.2) requires that the range of quantities where prices are positive
is an interval where
00()+ 0() 5 0, (9)
which follows from Novshek’s conditions. Moreover, Theorem 3.2 confirms
the intuition that smoothness is indeed dispensable for the existence asser-
tion. The nondifferentiable variant of the marginal revenue condition (9), as
suggested informally by Novshek, would then require that () be concave
in ln() at positive prices. These cases are not exhaustive, as will be shown
in the next section.
What is the economic content of the biconcavity assumption? In the
smooth case with downwards-sloping positive inverse demand, Lemma 2.2
shows that the condition can be reformulated into
1 + 0 + (||− 1) = 0 (10)
for  ∈ [0; 1], where  = 0()() and 0 = 00()0() denote the
elasticities of inverse demand and its first derivative. We are going to argue
that condition (10) captures the intuition that a firm’s marginal revenue at a
given output level may actually be increasing in the aggregate output of the
other firms, but only if this marginal revenue is negative, which rules out a
best response.
7Moreover, for logconcave prices and linear costs, the proof goes through without
monotonicity of demand, generalizing Amir’s (1996) Theorem 4.2 to asymmetric firms.
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For a heuristic derivation that supports this interpretation, we start from
Novshek’ (1985) result that a downwards-sloping inverse demand function 
does not guarantee existence for general (nondecreasing) cost functions if the
marginal revenue condition fails at a “potential optimal output.” So consider
nonnegative output levels  for firm  and − for the rivals of firm  such
that the marginal revenue condition fails, i.e., assume
0( +−) + 00( +−)  0. (11)
Rewriting (11) in terms of elasticities yields the less familiar inequality
1 + 0  −− , (12)
The marginal revenue condition (9) ensures that the left-hand side of this
inequality is nonnegative, so that Novshek’s construction of counterexamples
is not feasible. To obtain a tighter condition, note that non-existence may
occur if together with (12), we have that  is potentially (i.e., for a suitable
nondecreasing cost function), a best response to −, i.e., if
( +−)  (0 +−)0 (0  ). (13)
To fix ideas, assume that revenues are strictly quasiconcave in own output.
Then condition (13) is actually equivalent to revenues being nondecreasing
in own output, i.e.,
( +−) + 0( +−) = 0. (14)
Equivalently,
||− 1 5 − . (15)
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Clearly, conditions (12) and (15) cannot be satisfied simultaneously if (10)
holds for some  ∈ [0; 1]. Thus, as would follow also more directly from
Theorem 3.2, the biconcavity assumption implies that the marginal revenue
condition is satisfied at any “potential optimal output,” precluding Novshek’s
construction of counterexamples.8
We conclude this section with a few remarks on the remaining assump-
tions made in Theorem 3.2. We first note that the particular form of the
upper boundary condition (1) in the statement of the theorem is not cru-
cial. A more restrictive requirement would be that the price function reaches
zero at some finite output level. Note also that the assumption of ( 1−)-
biconcavity implies continuity of inverse demand in the interior of the domain
where   0. Therefore, the left-continuity assumption on the price function
 matters only if  jumps to zero. Without left-continuity at such a jump,
the firm’s problem of setting an optimal output level may not allow a solu-
tion, and an equilibrium need not exist. Finally, unbounded prices are not
generally inconsistent with existence.
4. Tightness
This section discusses the tightness of the biconcavity assumption. It is shown
first that none of the values for  listed in Theorem 3.2 can be dropped with-
out losing generality. We then investigate if biconcavity properties marginally
weaker than those required above would yield the same conclusions.
We come to the first result. Provided that costs are strictly increasing,
there is a continuum of pairwise independent biconcavity conditions, para-
8It does not seem feasible to use this heuristic derivation to strengthen the existence
result.
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meterized by . In particular, Theorem 3.2 is more general than the union
of existing results.
Proposition 4.1. For each  ∈ [0; 1], there exists an inverse demand func-
tion  such that (i) for any number of firms  = 1 and for any specifica-
tion of strictly increasing and left-continuous cost functions 1   , the
assumptions of Theorem 3.2 hold, and (ii) for any b ∈ R, the function  is
(b 1− b)-biconcave if and only b = .
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
Next, to explore the tightness of the biconcavity assumption made in The-
orem 3.2, we investigate examples of demand function that satisfy weaker
requirements. It turns out that a further relaxation of the concavity condi-
tions within the class of biconcavity conditions is not feasible without losing
the property of strategic substitutes.
Theorem 4.2. Let   be parameters such that at least one of the inequal-
ities  +   1,   0, or   0 holds. Then, for any given  = 2, there
exists an inverse demand function  and cost functions 1   , in general
depending on  , such that
1. there exists an output level  = 0 such that () 5 ()− (0) for
all    and for all  = 1   ,
2. the function  is nonincreasing, left-continuous with lim→0() = 0,
as well as ( )-biconcave, and
3. for  = 1   , the cost function  : R+ → R+ is left-continuous and
nondecreasing,
yet  does not allow a nonincreasing selection for any  = 1   .
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Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
To construct these counterexamples, one starts from inverse demand func-
tions that are just somewhat too convex to satisfy the assumptions of the
existence theorem. Then, cost functions are carefully chosen such that the
best-response correspondence is single valued, and such that the best re-
sponse is strictly increasing when rivals’ joint output is not too large.
5. An “atypical” case with strategic substitutes
Besides allowing to relax conditions for equilibrium existence, the notion
of biconcavity can be used to identify examples of Cournot games with new
properties. In this section, we show that a costless Cournot game with strate-
gic substitutes may exhibit (locally) strategic complementarities once linear
costs are introduced. This possibility may be unexpected because one might
suspect that the presence of costs would create, if anything, an asymmetry
in favor of nonincreasing best-responses. However, as the example proves,
this need not be the case when strategic substitutes are based on the ordi-
nal notion of submodularity. The example is economically relevant because
it shows that even linear taxes, which have a similar effect as linear costs,
might affect strategic interaction in a potentially important way.
We come to our example. It will be shown that ordinal submodularity is
not stable under the introduction of linear costs.
Example 5.1. Consider inverse demand () =p(1−) for 0   5
1 and () = 0 for   1. The function  is ( 1 − )-biconcave for
 = 2. Hence, by Lemma 2.3, squared revenues ( −)2 are submodular
at positive prices. The firm’s objective function is strictly concave in own
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output provided  5 1. So the best response with zero variable costs is
nonincreasing. However, with positive variable costs, this need not be true
anymore. Since revenues are not submodular everywhere when increasing in
own output, it is feasible to construct a counterexample. For instance, for
 = 01, b = 05, − = 0, b− = 01, and costs () = 05 · , the single-
crossing condition is violated. Moreover, as a numerical calculation shows,
the best response with costs satisfies (−) ≈ 0276  0286 ≈ ( b−), i.e.,
it is not weakly decreasing.
While illustrating the proof of Theorem 4.2, the example given here suggests
also an extension of Theorem 3.2 to parameter values satisfying   1.
However, as should be clear from the previous section, the expansion of
the parameter range comes at the cost of an additional assumption. Indeed,
because the transformation  is convex, the appropriate condition on inverse
demand is here that each firm ’s net-of-variable-cost demand b = − must
be ( 1− )-biconcave for some   1.
Proposition 5.2. Consider an -firm Cournot oligopoly. Assume that for
each  = 1   , there is an   1 such that b is ( 1 − )-biconcave.
Then the quantity-setting game is ordinally submodular at positive prices.
In particular, with the boundary condition (1) from Theorem 3.2 imposed, a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. The ordinal submodularity of profits at positive prices follows im-
mediately from Lemma 2.3. A straightforward adaptation of the proof of
Theorem 3.2 proves then the existence claim. ¤
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6. Further extensions
This section deals with extensions concerning global complementarities, strict
quasiconcavity, technological indivisibilities, and equilibrium uniqueness.
Global complementarities. An approach alternative to the one used so far
is to identify Cournot games with global strategic complementarities, and
to prove existence via Tarski’s fixed point theorem.9 In this subsection, we
will generalize an existence result in this vein that was hitherto restricted to
logconvex price functions.
For parameters   ∈ R, inverse demand  will be called ( )-biconvex
if the support set  = {  0 : ()  0} is an interval, and (()) is
convex in () for  ∈ . Logconvexity is equivalent to (0 1)-biconvexity,
yet global complementarities result for any ( 1 − )-biconvex inverse de-
mand, where  5 0.
Proposition 6.1. Consider an -firm oligopoly with exogenous capacities
1   , and for each firm  = 1   , a linear cost functions () = 
for  ∈ [0; ], where  = 0. Assume that for each  = 1   , there is an
 5 0 such that b is ( 1 − )-biconvex on [0 1 +  +  ]. Then the
quantity-setting game is ordinally supermodular at positive prices. Moreover,
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. To prove the claim, note that -transformed revenues are super-
modular in ( −) provided (( +−)) is convex in 1−(). The as-
sertion follows now from Lemma B.2 in the Appendix. The existence follows
from Tarski’s fixed point theorem, applied to nondecreasing best-response
9Ordinally supermodular games have many useful properties which are not reviewed
here. See Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
17
selections which are constructed as in the proof of Theorem 3.2. ¤
The result above generalizes Amir’s (1996) Theorem 3.2, which corresponds
to the case  = 0. The generalization is strict, as the following example
shows.
Example 6.2. Consider the inverse demand function () = (1 +1−)1
for   0. It is straightforward to verify that  is not logconvex. However, 
is ( 1− )-biconvex.
Global complementarities obtain also in duopoly games satisfying the gen-
eralized assumptions of either Theorem 3.2 or Proposition 5.2, provided the
order on either firm’s strategy space is reversed.
Strict quasiconcavity. The literature on the Cournot game offers a diversity
of criteria for strict quasiconcavity. One test checks if () is strictly
concave and  is strictly decreasing. With convex costs, this ensures strict
quasiconcavity (cf. Murphy et al., 1982). Another test checks the inequality
00 − 202  0 (cf. Amir, 1996). This test works in the smooth model
provided  is nonincreasing, and provided costs are both nondecreasing and
convex. For nonconvex technologies, the requirement on the demand function
will generally depend on the shape of the cost function. One important
differentiable test allowing for this possibility requires logconcavity of  and
0 −  00  0 (cf. Vives, 1999).
Maybe interestingly, the notion of biconcavity can be used to generalize
and unify all these criteria for the smooth model, integrating not only the
slope of the demand function, but also its curvature.
Proposition 6.3. Consider firm ’s problem, keeping − = 0 fixed. Let 
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be twice continuously differentiable when positive, and nonincreasing. Fur-
thermore, let  be twice continuously differentiable, nondecreasing, and in
fact strictly increasing unless   0. For some  5 1,  5 1, assume that
(i) ∆ 5 0 and (ii) ( + )0 −  00 5 0 at positive prices and quantities.
If in addition, at least one of the inequalities (i) and (ii) holds strictly, then
Π( −) is strictly quasiconcave in  = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix. ¤
The following example illustrates the use of the criterion.
Example 6.4. Consider the inverse demand function  of Example 6.2.
One can check that () is not concave, that  is not logconcave, and that
00− 202  0 does not hold. However,  is ( 1− )-biconcave and strictly
decreasing, therefore ( 1)-biconcave since   0. Thus, from Proposition
6.3, the firm’s problem is strictly quasiconcave provided that  ∈ (−1; 0).
Indivisibilities. So far, we assumed that technologies do not exhibit indi-
visibilities. However, neither Kukushkin’s nor Tarski’s fixed point theorem
requires choice sets to be convex. Moreover, the monotonicity of a best
response selection, the completeness of the strategy lattice, and upper hemi-
continuity of best response correspondences are all inherited to arbitrary
compact subsets of the strategy space. As a consequence, the existence as-
sertions contained in Theorem 3.2, Proposition 5.2, as well as Proposition 6.1
all hold when firms’ choices are restricted to closed subsets. In particular,
the existence is ensured for any discretization of the quantity scale. This
generalizes results obtained by Dubey et al. (2006).
Implications for uniqueness. Finally, the methods developed in this paper
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can be used to strengthen various existing uniqueness results.10
Proposition 6.6. Assume that  is once differentiable when positive with
0  0, and ( 1− )-biconcave, for some  ∈ [0; 1]. Assume either
(i)   1, and  is strictly increasing and convex for  = 1   , or
(ii) both  and the ’s are twice continuously differentiable with −0+ 00  0
at positive prices.
Then there is at most one Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Impose first condition (i). It follows then from the second part of
Lemma 3.1 that any selection from  must be nonincreasing. Moreover, a
standard supermodularity argument shows that the slope of the best response
is strictly larger than −1. The assertion then follows from Theorem 2.8 in
Vives (1999). Impose now condition (ii). Then, by Proposition 6.3 above, 
is single-valued. The argument now proceeds as in the first case. ¤
In particular, in a smooth Cournot model, sufficient conditions for equilib-
rium uniqueness and strict quasiconcavity are that 0  0, the function 
is ( 1 − )-biconcave for some  ∈ [0; 1], and 0 −  00  0 for all . This
extends a well-known criterion (cf. Vives, 1999).
Appendix: Proofs
This appendix contains two auxiliary results and proofs of results stated in
the body of the paper.
Lemma A.1. Let  = 0. Then for any  5 1 [ = 1], the translation map-
ping  :  7→  +  , defined on R+, is ( )—biconvex [ ( )—biconcave].
10See, in particular, Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1982), Murphy et al. (1982), and Amir
(1996).
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Proof. Using the smooth criterion for biconcavity, Lemma 2.2,  is ( )-
biconcave [biconvex] if and only if (1− ) 5 0 [= 0]. Thus, if  5 1, then
 is ( )-biconvex, while for  = 1, the function  is ( )-biconcave. ¤
Lemma A.2. Assume that a function  is ( 1−)-biconcave [ ( 1−)-
biconvex] and nonincreasing, for  = 0 [for  5 0]. Then ( +  ) is
( 1− )-biconcave [ ( 1− )-biconvex] in  for any  = 0.
Proof. Assume first that  is ( 1 − )-biconcave with  = 0. Then
(()) is concave and nonincreasing in 1−() in the interval where   0.
Substituting  by + , it follows trivially that ((+ )) is concave and
nonincreasing in 1−( +  ) in the interval where   0. But by Lemma
A.1, 1−(+ ) is convex in 1−() provided  = 0. Since any composition
of a concave and nonincreasing function with a convex function is concave,
((+ )) must be concave in 1−() in the interval where   0. Hence,
( +  ) is indeed ( 1 − )-biconcave in . The assertion for biconvex
functions is proved in an analogous way. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Write  =  and  = . By the standard
differential condition, the function (()) is concave as a function of ()





is nonincreasing in (), or what is equivalent, nonincreasing in . Dif-
ferentiating the right-hand side of (16) with respect to  delivers that  is
( )-biconcave if and only if
0()00(()) 0()2 + 0()0(()) 00()− 0(()) 0()00() 5 0. (17)
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Replacing the derivatives of  and  by the respective explicit expressions,
and subsequently multiplying through with ()2−2− delivers (3). This
proves the assertion. ¤
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Fix e = 0 for the moment. Then, by Lemma A.2,
(+ e ) is ( 1−)-biconcave in , i.e., ((+ e )) is concave in 1−()
in the interval where   0. Since any concave function is differentiable
almost everywhere, with a derivative that is weakly decreasing,
(( + e ))
1−() =
0(( + e )) 0( + e )
01−() (18)
is both a.e. well-defined and nonincreasing in 1−(), or equivalently, in .
Recalling the fact that a concave function of one variable, defined on an open
domain, is absolutely continuous on any compact subinterval of its domain,
it is easy to check that (∗( )) is absolutely continuous on [ b ]. Hence,
(∗( b ))− (∗(  )) = Z 





0(( + e )) 0( + e )
01−() 
e (20)
is nonincreasing in . This proves the lemma. ¤
Proof of Lemma 3.1. To prove the dual single-crossing property, assume
that Π( −) = Π(b −). There are two cases. Assume first that, in
fact, ( −) = (b −). Write  = . Clearly, since  ◦  is
submodular and  is strictly increasing,  satisfies the dual single-crossing
property (cf. Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). Hence, ( b−) = (b b−).
Since costs are nondecreasing, Π(b b−) = Π( b−), as desired. Assume
now that ( −)  (b −). We will show that in this case,
(b b−)−( b−) 5 (b −)−( −), (21)
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which is sufficient for the dual single-crossing property. For this, write  =
((b b−)) and
 = (( −))− ((b −)) + ((b b−)). (22)
As  is strictly increasing, it follows from the case assumption that   .
Moreover, since  in nonincreasing,
(b −) = b(b +−) = b(b + b−) = (b b−), (23)
which implies that  ≡ ((b −))− ((b b−)) = 0. Denote by −1
the inverse function of . Since −1 is convex, −1(e + e) is supermodular
in (e e). Hence,
−1()− −1() 5 −1(+ )− −1( + ). (24)
Plugging the expressions for , , and  into (24) and simplifying yields
−1{(( −))− ((b −)) + ((b b−))}
= (b b−)−(b −) +( −). (25)
On the other hand, from the submodularity property of  ◦,
(( b−)) = (( −))− ((b −)) + ((b b−)), (26)
or equivalently,
( b−) = −1{(( −))− ((b −)) + ((b b−))}. (27)
Combining (25) with (27), one arrives at (21), as desired. To prove the
second assertion, note that in the first case considered above, Π( b−) 
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Π(b b−) because costs are strictly increasing. In the second case,   0
because  is strictly decreasing when positive, and −1 is strictly convex, so
again, the second inequality in (8) is strict. This proves the second assertion,
whence the lemma. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.2. By assumption, each firm’s effective choice set is
compact. Take arbitrary quantities b−  − = 0. Clearly, the profit
function is upper semicontinuous in own output, for any given level of rivals’
output. Since any u.s.c. function on a compact set attains a maximum
value and the set of maximizers is compact, ( b−) and (−) are compact
and non-empty. Take b = min ( b−) and  = min (−). We will show
that b 5 . To provoke a contradiction, assume b  . Then, clearly,
Π( b−)  Π(b b−). Write ( −) = ( +−). By assumption,
there exists a parameter  ∈ [0; 1] such that  is ( 1−)-biconcave. Since a
positive production level leading to a zero market price is strictly dominated,
(b b−)  0 and ( −)  0. Lemma 2.3 implies
((b −))−(( −)) = ((b b−))−(( b−)). (28)
Using Lemma 3.1,
Π( −)−Π(b −) = 0⇒ Π( b−)−Π(b b−) = 0. (29)
Hence, Π( −)  Π(b −), which contradicts the maximum property
of . Consequently,  = b, as desired. Thus, taking the minimum within
each best-response set, a selection  is constructed that is nonincreasing
in rivals’ output. This proves the first assertion. For the second assertion,
one notes that, since  is left-continuous and nondecreasing,  is lower
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semi-continuous. Moreover, either  is continuous in ( −), viz. when
 is continuous at positive quantities, or  is continuous in ( −) in the
closed domain where ( + −)  0, viz. when  jumps to zero. In either
case, profits are quasi-transfer upper continuous in ( −) with respect to
[0;]. To see why, assume that
Π(b −)  Π( −), (30)
and consider a small perturbation of ( −). If costs jump upwards through
the perturbation, inequality (30) still holds. On the other hand, if revenues
drop to zero through the perturbation, then necessarily (b −)  0,
hence b  0. Since revenues are continuous in the domain of positive prices,
we may replace b by a smaller value so that (30) still holds. This shows that
Π is indeed quasi-transfer upper continuous. It follows now from Theorem 3
in Tian and Zhou (1995) that  has a closed graph when firms are restricted
to choose a quantity from the compact interval [0;]. Consequently, the
assumptions of Kukushkin’s (1994) fixed point theorem are satisfied in the
restricted game. But a choice above  can never increase profits. Thus, an
equilibrium exists also in the unconstrained game. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4.1. At  ∈ (0; 1), choose () = (1−1−)1 for
 5 1, and = 0 for   1. The test
∆1−() = (b− )(1− − )(1−1−)2−22 5 0, (31)
holds for all  ∈ (0; 1) if and only if b = . At  = 0, choose () =
exp(−). Here, ∆1−() = b(− 1) exp(−)2, which is globally nonpos-
itive if and only if b = 0. At  = 1, choose () = − ln() for  5 1, and
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= 0 for   1. Also in this case, the test
∆1−() = −(1− b)1 + ln() 5 0 (32)
holds for all  ∈ (0; 1) if and only if b = 1. Clearly, for all  ∈ [0; 1], with
specifications of demand as made above, the assumptions of Theorem 3.2
hold for any specification of costs 1   , provided these cost functions
are strictly increasing and left-continuous. Hence, the assertion. ¤
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Consider first the case   1,   1. Then,
by assumption,  +   1. Furthermore, since ( )-biconcavity is more
stringent for higher values of  and  (cf. Section 2), we may assume without
loss of generality that   0 and   0. Consider () = (1 − )1
for   1 and () = 0 for  = 0. One can check that ∆() ≡ 0.
Hence,  is ( )-biconcave. Define () ≡ 0 for  = 1   . It follows
from Proposition 6.3 below that firm ’s problem is strictly quasiconcave.
Moreover, an implicit differentiation of the first-order condition 0 +  = 0







00() + 20() =
1− − 
+   0. (33)
where the second equality follows from ∆() ≡ 0 and the first-order con-
dition. The remaining conditions can be easily checked. This proves the
assertion in the case   1,   1. Assume now  = 1. Then, by assump-
tion,   0. Consider () = (− 1)1 for   1 and () = 0 for  = 0.
Without loss of generality, +   1, so that lim→0() = 0. Assuming








1− −  + (− 1) 0()()





(e − 1)1e (35)
for  = 1   . Clearly,  0() = (), and  00 () = 0(). By Proposition






2(− 1) +  . (36)
Without loss of generality,   0 can be chosen close to zero such that
2(− 1)+ is positive. But then, (36) is positive. This proves the assertion
in the case  = 1. Assume, finally,  = 1. Then, by assumption,   0.
Hence, without loss of generality,  +   1. Consider () = (1 + )1
for  = 0. For   0 small, choose cost functions
() = (+  − )
Z 
0
(1 + e )1e (37)
for  = 1   . Clearly,  0() = ( +  − )(), and  00 () = ( +  −






1− −  + (− 1)(+  − )
+  + (− 2)(+  − ) . (38)
For  small enough, the denominator is negative, so that (38) is positive
also in this case. Since all possible cases have been covered, this proves the
assertion. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6.3. It is shown first that Π( −) is strictly
quasiconcave in the largest open interval e where   0 and   0. If e is
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empty, there is nothing to show, so assume e 6= ∅. It suffices to show that
2Π2  0 at any  ∈ e with Π = 0 (see, e.g., Diewert et al., 1981).
So take  ∈ e with
0 = 0() + ()−  0(), (39)
where we write  for  +−. With ()  0 satisfied within e, it follows
from the assumption that
0 = (− 1)0()2+ ()00()+ (1− )()0(). (40)
Multiplying (39) through with (1−)0(), and (40) with   0, a simple
addition yields
0 = −(1−)0() 0()+()(00()+0(){(1−)+ (1−)}). (41)
For  5 1, the first term is nonnegative. Hence, noting that  5 1, and
exploiting the remaining assumptions, one finds the second-order condition
0  00() + 20() −  00 (). Thus, Π is indeed strictly quasiconcave one. Since Π is continuous in  = 0, the function Π must also be strictly
quasiconcave on e ∪ {0}. This proves the assertion in the case where   0.
If, however,  reaches zero at a finite output level, costs must be strictly
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